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Europe: a fundamental re-think
May 11 2005 "A relationship based solely on free trade and voluntary inter-governmental co-operation" Key planks of Conservative thinking include liberty, representative democracy, limited government, enterprise and the market economy, family, nation and defence of the realm. Almost every one of these planks is challenged and degraded by the European project. In 1975, the British people were asked to vote in a referendum on continued membership of the (then) Common Market. EU apologists insist that the small print at that time made clear the integrationist ambitions of the European project. But this is mere sophistry. The average voter does not read the small print, and should not suffer for failing to do so. The main thrust of the debate in the public media, and the main message given to voters, was about trade and jobs. And not surprisingly, the British people were happy to vote for trade and jobs. It was not just a case of missing the small print. Pro-EU campaigners offered specific assurances which were at best misleading, at worst down-right lies. Edward Heath said "There is of course no threat to the fundamental sovereignty of our nation". Harold Wilson said "the threat of a common currency, which would damage British job prospects " (author's italics -- at least Wilson was right on this aspect) "has been removed". Those promises have clearly been broken. And the promise of trade and jobs has arguably been broken too. Prosperity in the whole of the developed world has increased enormously in the last thirty years, but it is difficult to make the case that membership of the EU has helped the British economy. The 2005 Lib-Dem election manifesto said "EU membership has been hugely valuable for British jobs", as if this were self-evident. But it is not. EU growth has fallen behind that of other developed economies. European countries that have not joined the EU -- Switzerland, Norway, Iceland -- have amongst the highest per-capita GDP in Europe. And it is difficult to argue that the EU's Single Market has helped trade. Switzerland's exports to the EU, (on a per-capita basis) are double Britain's. Over the last ten years, US exports to the EU have grown faster than British exports to the EU. Trade between the EU and third countries is growing faster than intra-EU trade -- exactly the reverse of pro-EU predictions. An extraordinarily telling quote comes from the German Bundesbank -- not noted for its euro-sceptic approach. In its monthly report of October 2003, it says that it can find no evidence that the EU's Single Market has helped German trade. In fact the old-fashioned EU's Customs Union, its dirigiste, corporatist regulatory approach, and it "social model" are inimical to competitiveness, and negate any benefits from the much vaunted "consumer market of 400 million people". Recent studies suggest that the net cost of Britain's EU membership is around £40 billion a year, or 4% of GDP. This would be an enormous burden even if we had benefits to show for it. But we do not. A number of people, including notably Lord Pearson of Rannoch, have called on the government for a White Paper setting out a full cost-benefit analysis of our EU membership. The government has refused, ostensibly because "the benefits of membership are self-evident". The cynic may be forgiven for suspecting the true reason: that they know what the outcome would be, and they fear it. That is why the next Conservative government must promise an EU cost/benefit White Paper. If the EU has done little for jobs and trade, it has done less for democracy. As Tony Benn famously said, "The test of a democracy is whether we can dismiss the people who make our laws". In the UK, as in the USA, clearly we can. In the EU, clearly we cannot. Our democratically elected government in Westminster is forced to accept measures it knows are damaging to this country, (often, ironically, measures for which Labour MEPs have voted in Strasbourg), but which it is powerless to resist. Former Home Secretary David Blunkett proposed a number of reasonable measures, especially in the field of immigration, which would command the broad support of sensible people, only to see them struck down by the courts on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights, which his own government passed into law in 1997. By the government's own admission, more than half of our new laws now come from Brussels. They are made in foreign institutions where we have no control and little influence. And any influence we have will be steadily diluted as new countries, possibly including Turkey, join the EU and reduce Britain's voting weight. The public, perhaps subconsciously, have grasped the fact that "democracy at the European level" is a sham and a delusion, and they respond, reasonably enough, by staying away from euro-elections. It would be easy enough to list many more of the follies and failures of the EU if space permitted -- the disastrous Common Fisheries Policy, the parliament's demented commuting between Brussels and Strasbourg, the arcane budget mechanisms, and so on -- but the point is made. It is because of public disillusionment with the EU that a fringe single-issue party, UKIP, scored a spectacular success in June 2004. Coming from a low base, it scored 17% of the vote, and won twelve out of the UK's 78 euro-seats. Conservatives should not underestimate the implications of UKIP's success. Although there share of the vote declined to 2 to 3% in the General Election of May 2005, and they lost hundreds of deposits, they probably cost the Conservative Party a couple of dozen seats. A few days before the June euro-election, a poll published in the Times, undertaken amongst intending Conservative voters, showed that a majority of those who expressed an opinion would prefer to leave the EU rather than stay in. Fortunately, the policy changes needed to recover these voters attracted to fringe rejectionist parties, in terms of electoral tactics, are also the policy changes which are right for Britain. A constant refrain during the euro-elections, from members of the public of all parties and of no party, was that they had voted in 1975 for trade, for jobs, for a common market, not for the political union which they now see being created around them. It's not that they want to be "isolated or marginalised" (in Labour's mendacious phrase). They are not "anti-European". Many of them love Europe, European cars, European wines, European holidays, European golf and football. But they have a fundamental sense that we in Britain should govern ourselves, and they just can't see why that modest objective should be incompatible with trade and co-operation in Europe. So that, in essence, is what the Conservative Party needs to deliver. Our Party members, and the country, overwhelmingly want a relationship with Europe based solely on free trade and voluntary co-operation. There are those, of course, who will insist that such a relationship amounts to withdrawal. But given our geographical proximity to Europe, and our shared history over several decades with the EU and its precursors, it would be more appropriate to use Bill Cash's phrase, "Associate Membership". This would satisfy three distinct constituencies. First, there is a sector of UK opinion, which, while exasperated with the EU and all its works, is nevertheless, after thirty years of EU membership, vulnerable to Labour's rhetoric of "isolation and marginalisation". We are, after all, a conservative nation (with a small "c"). These people would be reassured by keeping a form of membership, although much diluted. Secondly, there are our current EU partners, who should not be left out of the calculus. For the EU, to have a major economy like the UK withdraw altogether would be a fearsome, perhaps a terminal, loss of face. They would prefer to keep us in some form of membership, at any price, rather than see us go. We saw the profound impact a few years ago when Austria hinted at a referendum on continued membership. The third group of course is that little handful of speech-writers at CCO who have always insisted that withdrawal is not an option. If we are to spare Brussels' blushes, we can spare theirs too! The Conservative Party is already committed to substantial renegotiation of Britain's terms of membership. We have said, rightly, that we will reject the Constitution and the euro, we will repatriate fisheries and foreign aid, and we will withdraw from the social chapter that Labour so rashly signed in 1997. We should now pursue this approach to its logical conclusion, and renegotiate or reject all policy areas which are not clearly in the national interest, or where as a matter of principle we insist that an independent nation must have competence. We will need to quit the CAP, and develop a new, British farm subsidy régime within the terms of the WTO. We will keep, or take back, full control of justice and home affairs, policing; foreign affairs, security and defence; economic, industrial, employment and social policy, including health and safety; transport and energy; environment and public health. We must repeal the ECHR. We must stress again that we have no intention of being "isolated". In many or most of these policy areas we will be keen to co-operate closely with many countries, including those nearest to us on the continent of Europe. But we will co-operate as a sovereign, independent nation. We will not be subject to the diktats of Brussels institutions. In June 2004, UKIP voters came from three main categories. They had previously voted (1) for the Conservatives; or (2) for other parties; or (3) not at all, either because they reject the EU in principle and declined to legitimise its institutions by voting, or because none of the main parties' EU agendas were attractive to them. There are indications that the third of these groups may have been the biggest -- a factor in the increased turnout in 2004. All of these groups, especially (1) and (3), are likely to be attracted by the new policy outlined above. On the other hand, there are also, in the Party, a handful of people who would be dismayed by such a hardening of policy on the EU, and we might lose them. But we shall never succeed as long as we face both ways. We must offer a wide-ranging disengagement from the European project, because it will galvanise the Party; because it is a formula for electoral victory; and above all because it is right for our country. The stock argument against renegotiation is well-known. We should not be allowed to get away with it, they say. Treaty changes require unanimity. Our twenty-four partners would simply say "NO", and that would be the end of it. Leaving aside the point that several of our partners might well come in on our side, there is an issue here. If we merely go and ask for our ball back, and our neighbours refuse, what do we do next? And it is here that we have to bite the bullet. Withdrawal is not, and has not been our policy. But if we present the legitimate demands of the British people, validated in a general election, and European governments choose to frustrate our wishes, then the question of our continued EU membership will arise, like it or not. If our partners clearly understand that their recalcitrance will lead us to question our membership, there can be little doubt that they will offer us any reasonable terms to avoid the body-blow of British withdrawal. If not, then the choice is between staying in on today's basis (and probably accepting tomorrow's Constitution) -- or leaving. Given that stark alternative, there can be little doubt that withdrawal would be in the British interest. Wide-ranging renegotiation is and must be a pre-condition of continued membership. Policy Action Plan
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